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Intellectual property rights and living organismsIntroduction
One of the most contentious issues accompanying
new developments in bioscience, biomedicine and
biotechnology has been the debate surrounding
the patenting of living things. The debate touches
on many of the legal, ethical and social concerns
that come bundled with advances in science and
technology, and with how these advances are
understood, governed and capitalised upon. In-
deed, the intellectual property rights (IPR) system
has been positioned at the heart of several
historical and contemporary controversies to do
with how we respond to new developments in
science and technology and how we negotiate new
ethical, legal, social and/or other boundaries as
a result.
What follows will be an attempt to very briefly
sketch out some of the principal lines of conten-
tion that have characterised the debates around
the patenting of life forms. I will look initially at
the history of the notion of patentability for
living things, then at some of the specific
ramifications of the ever-evolving scope and scale
of patents on living things focusing on concepts
such as the ‘patent thicket’ and ‘patent creep’.
Finally, I will look in slightly more detail at
a specific controversy in the field, namely that
of ‘biopiracy’.
Patentability for living organisms
Historically, as the nature of industrial produc-
tion changed one of the problems that became
apparent was that there was a great deal of
effort being put into designing new machines,
dyes, and other inventions but once these were
made and sold, they were relatively easily
copied. The idea behind the IPR system was1743-9191/$ - see front matter ª 2006 Surgical Associates Ltd. Pub
doi:10.1016/j.ijsu.2006.03.003that if inventors knew that they would be
somehow rewarded for the amount of time,
effort and resources that they put into ‘in-
venting’, then they would continue to do so for
their (short term) financial benefit, and for the
long-term benefit of society.1 The social benefit
would come from the patent process itself, which
obliged the inventor to submit a full description
of the nature of their invention with the patent.2
This same logic has been borne out in the patent
system’s treatment of the biotechnology industry.
Indeed, the prevailing logic within the IPR system
is that in order for society to reap the benefits
that come from the development of new drugs,
those making the sizable investment in drug re-
search and development need guarantees that
they will be rewarded to an extent that would
justify their investment. As the Biotechnology
Industry Organization puts it; ‘‘intellectual prop-
erty protection is the key factor for economic
growth and advancement in the biotechnology
sector. Patents add value to laboratory discover-
ies and in doing so provide incentives for private
sector investment into biotechnology develop-
ment’’.3 For their part, the Pharmaceutical Man-
ufacturers of America claim it ‘‘takes 10e15
years and costs $800 million on average to bring
1 Originally, the patent system was seen to have a primarily
social function e the inventor was granted protection to
exclude others from making money on their invention for a limit-
ed time, after which time the invention, and the knowledge
of its use, entered the public domain (c.f. Drahos, P. (1996). A
philosophy of intellectual property. Sydney, Dartmouth.)
2 See for exampleDrahos, P. (1996).Aphilosophyof intellectual
property. Sydney, Dartmouth.
3 Biotechnology Industry Organization (2006). The importance
of intellectual property. Online, last accessed Feb 17, 2006
(http://www.bio.org/ip).lished by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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ures have proven controversial,5 it is clear that
the money involved is significant, and that access
to drugs, new and old, has a significant impact on
the practice of medicine.
As the patent system evolved, the ‘‘product of
nature’’ doctrine was developed, which sug-
gested that ‘‘while processes derived to extract
what is found in nature can be patented, objects
discovered there cannot’’.6 This was seen as
a means to deter people from simply patenting
things they ‘discovered’ in nature. Some tension
in the system emerged, however, when advances
in science and technology led to an increase in
‘inventions’ that directly involved ‘products of
nature’. As Eisenberg has explained, much of
the controversy has come about because the pat-
ent system was built for a ‘bricks and mortar
world’ rather than an information economy,
which is compounded by the fact that genes
can be seen as ‘‘both material molecules and in-
formational systems’’.7 Or, put another way, the
patent system might well have been calibrated to
deal with a design for Emerson’s ‘better mouse-
trap’8 but not, as it were, with a design for a
better mouse.
Currently, the criteria for patentability still
vary slightly from country to country, although
there are ongoing efforts to harmonise different
national patent regimes. For our purposes, how-
ever, we can look at what can generally be said to
be common criteria of patentability: novelty (that
something is new), non-obviousness (that it in-
volves some measure of non-obvious inventive
step), and usefulness (that it has some applica-
tion).9 It is often people’s intuitive reaction that,
as they are ‘natural’, living things simply cannot
4 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America. (2006). Issues:
Intellectual property. Online (Online, Accessed Feb 16, 2006.
http://www.phrma.org/index.php?option¼com_content&task¼
view&id¼123&Itemid¼109&cat¼IntellectualþProperty).
5 Angell is quite critical of industry claims about the need for
rigid intellectual property to encourage innovation as well as
the actual costs involved. See for example Angell, M. (2004).
The truth about the drug companies: How they deceive us and
what to do about it. London: Random House.
6 Kevles, D. (2002). A history of patenting life in the United
States with comparative attention to Europe and Canada. Euro-
pean Group on Ethics in Science and new Technologies to the
European Commission. Luxembourg: European Commission. p. 2.
7 Eisenberg, R. (2002). ‘‘How can you patent genes?’’ American
Journal of Bioethics 2(3): 3e11. p. 3.
8 Ralph Waldo Emerson is reputed to have made the oft quoted
(but probably apocryphal) remark ‘‘Build a better mousetrap
and the world will beat a path to your door’’.
9 The U.S. and European systems differ slightly on this point,
with the U.S. system using the term ‘utility’ and the European
system relying on a concept of ‘industrial applicability’.be ‘invented’ and thus cannot be patented. There
have, however, been several key cases that have
called that thinking into question, and have
forced a legal, if not always social, reinterpreta-
tion of what counts as ‘natural’ within the IPR
system.10
Diamond v. Chakrabarty
Although there are other cases that have done
a great deal of work to establish the boundaries of
patentability for living organisms, very few have
been as influential as the now widely known case
of Diamond v. Chakrabarty.11 In this case, studied
extensively elsewhere,12 a scientist (Chakrabarty)
working for General Electric genetically engineered
a strainofbacteria thatwereable todigest crudeoil.
Chakrabarty filed a patent on the organism, claiming
that by genetically altering the bacteria he had ‘in-
vented’ something that was not found in nature.
The patent was eventually challenged at the U.S.
SupremeCourt,whoruledthatthe intentof thepatent
system was for patentability to include ‘‘anything
under the sun that was made by man’’ and that
‘‘[.] his [Chakrabarty’s] discovery is not nature’s
handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable
subject matter [.] [emphasis added]’’.13
What Diamond v. Chakrabarty, and several of
the cases that have followed in its wake,14 have
done is to expand notions of what is patentable,
as well as expand the practice of describing an in-
vention undertaken to demonstrate that patent-
ability. The limits and scope of patentability are
still being negotiated in the courts and by policy
makers, but will likely be forever pushed by new
developments in technology.
Patented problems?
Perhaps more so than any other element of the
patent system, the patenting of living organisms
comes bundled with what many see as significant
10 For an excellent history of IPR in the life sciences see Dutfield,
G. (2003). Intellectual property rights and the life sciences indus-
tries: A twentieth century history. Hampshire, Ashgate.
11 Diamond,Commissionerof Patents andTrademarks v. Chakra-
barty, Certiorari to the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, 447 US 303, U.S. Supreme Court (1980).
12 For a particularly helpful analysis, see Kevles (op. cit.) and
Gold, R. (1996). Body parts: Property rights and the ownership
of human biological materials. Washington D.C., Georgetown
University Press.
13 ibid.
14 One example being the oncomouse (aka Harvard Mouse) case
as contested in the U.S., in Canada, and in Europe.
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the patent system has undergone a shift, mani-
fested in the Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision,
whereby it has been determined that the court’s
role was solely to arbiter on the economic impli-
cations of a patent, rather than on its possible
ethical implications. If the patent system, partic-
ularly where it pertains to living organisms, is in-
terpreted in purely economic terms it leaves
open questions as to who is the appropriate au-
thority to arbiter the other questions that arise
out of patent decisions (particularly when they
traverse such fraught ethical territory as ques-
tions about as how ‘natural’ does something
have to be in order for it to be ‘too natural’ to
be invented?).
Along with the pertinent ethical questions, the
dramatic expansion of what is patentable stem-
ming from Diamond v. Chakrabarty and other cases
has facilitated several attempts at developing con-
cepts to characterise the ever-evolving develop-
ments at the intersection of IPR and bioscience/
biotechnology.
In particular, there have been concerns raised
about the effect that patents can have on
research in science, technology, medicine and
agriculture. One of these concerns involves the
‘patent thicket’, which is described by Shapiro as
an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that
‘‘those seeking to commercialize new technology
obtain licenses from multiple patentees’’.16 The
problem with a patent thicket, it is surmised,
is that the density of patents around a particular
area will actually serve to hinder research in
that area, for the simple fact that researchers
would be worried about the possibility of their
research infringing on someone else’s patent.
Closely related to this is the notion of the ‘pat-
ent submarine’ which describes an instance
where, ‘‘drawing on published sources, a com-
pany or Public Research Organisation (PRO),
such as a university, develops a method for ge-
netic testing or analysis using genetic material
and subsequently discovers that such methods in-
fringe a patent’’.17 These two concepts can be
seen as quite closely related to the notion of
an anti-common that has been put forth by sev-
eral IPR scholars, where scientific research is
15 op. cit.
16 Shapiro, C. (2001). Navigating the patent thicket: Cross
licences, patent pools, and standard setting. Innovation Policy
and the Economy. A. Jaffe, J. Lerner and S. Stern, MIT Press. p. 1.
17 Oldham, P. (2004). Global status and trends in intellectual
property claims:Genomics, proteomics and biotechnology. CESA-
GEN United Kingdom, p. 37.actually limited by the increased importance of
secrecy bred by the IPR system.18
Concerns about biotechnological IPR are not
immune from some of the concerns voiced about
the expanding scope and scale of IPR in other
fields, such as software. For instance, legal
scholars such as James Boyle have cautioned that
we are entering into what he calls a ‘second
enclosure movement’ where ‘‘things that were
formerly thought of as either common property or
uncommodifiable are being covered with new, or
newly extended, property rights’’.19 This has often
been related to what some call an intellectual
property ‘land grab’, or a process of ‘patent
creep’, where the system is forced to expand by
ever more ambitious patents being filed.
For many, the ethical situation with patents on
life forms gets evenmore fraught and complexwhen
the consideration of the patentability of living
organisms expands to include material of human
origin. For example, a recent article in Science,
picked up on by many prominent newspapers,
claims that nearly 20% of human genes are explicitly
claimed as intellectual property in the U.S.20 The
debate about IPR on humanmaterial has had several
flashpoints, such as the substantial controversy sur-
rounding the sequencing of the human genome in
the latter part of the 90s. This very public contro-
versy pitted a public consortium versus a private
company in a race to sequence the human genome,
and perhaps more importantly, in a race to deter-
minewhether this datawould bemade freely acces-
sible to the public, or whether it would be held in
a database available only to subscribers.21
More recently, there have been activists/scien-
tists who have sought to press the boundaries of
what is patentable. In an attempt to demonstrate
some of the shortfalls of the patent system when it
comes to patents on human beings, one scientist is
attempting to patent human animal hybrids, which
he calls ‘chimeras’.22 Ostensibly the purpose of his
patent application is to draw attention to the ex-
panding notions of what is patentable, and to the
ways in which new biotechnological developments,
18 Heller, M. andR. Eisenberg (1998). ‘‘Can patents deter innova-
tion? The anticommons in biomedical research.’’ Science Maga-
zine 280: 698e701.
19 Boyle, J. (2003). ‘‘The second enclosure movement and the
construction of the public domain.’’ Law and Contemporary
Problems 66: 33e74, p. 37.
20 Jensen, K. and F. Murray (2005). ‘‘Intellectual property land-
scape of the human genome.’’ Science 310 (14 October 2005):
239e240.
21 For a discussion of this controversy, see Roberts, L. (2001).
‘‘Controversial from the start.’’ Science 291(5507): 1182e1188.
22 Slater, D. (2002). ‘‘Humouse tm.: Can you patent a monster?’’
Legal Affairs (November/December 2002).
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serve to challenge ethical, legal and social under-
standings of what should or should not be
patentable.23
Biopiracy
Along with the aforementioned concerns about the
haziness of the current landscape to do with
patents involving living things come concerns
about how the rules of IPR will be played out
internationally, especially in the developing world.
This becomes especially pertinent when combined
with certain international agreements, particu-
larly the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Trade
Related Intellectual Property Measures Agreement
(TRIPs) which mandates that all countries that are
part of the WTO implement a minimum standard of
intellectual property rights.
One of the other particularly contentious areas of
IPR for living things is an alleged process called
‘biopiracy’. The allegation of ‘biopiracy’ is gener-
ally designed to characterize a situation where
a patent is taken out in the developed world on
a genetic resource (or the knowledge of that
resource’s use) that has its origins in the developing
world.24 As it pertains tomedicine, the allegation of
‘biopiracy’ has been most famously made on pat-
ents that involve the medical uses of plants, espe-
cially where these uses were known before, for
instance to do with the wound-healing properties
of turmeric.25 Allegations of ‘biopiracy’ have also
been made in situations where patents have
emerged on materials derived from the collection
of human samples from populations in the develop-
ing world. In general, allegations of ‘biopiracy’ are
made where these patents are present, and where
there has been a perceived inadequate or incom-
plete attempt to share the benefits (economic or
otherwise) accruing from the patent, although in-
stances of ‘biopiracy’ cannot often be dealt with
simply in economic terms.26 Along with seeking to
problematize how the ‘benefits’ of genetic re-
sources are generated and shared via IPR,
23 op. cit.
24 This becomes more relevant when it is considered that a vast
majority of the world’s biodiversity-derived ‘genetic resources’
are located in developing countries.
25 Shiva, V. (1998). ‘‘The turmeric patent is just the first step in
stopping biopiracy’’, Third World Network, online, last accessed
November 2005.
26 Many claims of ‘biopiracy’ are also intimately bound up with
contestations about what prevails as a system of property, what
it means to ‘own’ knowledge (if such a thing is even possible),
and other concerns which fundamentally transcend mere eco-
nomic redistribution.allegations of ‘biopiracy’ can be seen as attempting
to make interventions in the patent system in order
to clarifywhat should and should not be patentable.
Conclusions
The patent system is an organic one, and has been
forced to grow and change in response to de-
velopments in science and technology. As has been
pointed to in this brief outline, the relationship
between the patent system and living organisms is
not as straightforward as might be assumed.
Through new developments in science and
technology as well as with the corresponding IPR
challenges, definitions of patentability have now
been stretched to encompass living organisms, in
previously unforeseen interpretations of various
IPR concepts. Issues such as biopiracy, patent
creep and the persistence of patent thickets,
however, point to legitimate concerns as to the
impact that the expanded scope and scale of IPR
will have on innovation as well as our understand-
ing of ethical practice in medicine and beyond.
It seems clear that the patent system plays an
integral one in the world of innovation and re-
search. However, the philosophical and ontological
questions raised by its expansion are fundamental
ones: What counts as living in the IPR system? What
counts as human? What does this mean for society?
What social effects will the IPR system have as the
patent system expands in its conceptual as well as
its territorial scope?
While obviously these are not easily answered,
the question that remains has to do, in a more
tangible sense, with how we will balance the
competing perspectives on invention, nature, hu-
manity, and IPR as we deal with new developments
in medicine, science, and technology.
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